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63-я Пагуошская конференция, Доха, Катар, 6-10 марта 2022 г.

Российская академия наук

Президиум РАН

 
63-я Пагуошская конференция учёных

Михаил Дмитриевич
МИЛЛИОНЩИКОВ
(1913 - 1973), президент
Пагуошского движения ученых, председатель
Советского Пагуошского комитета




Безопасность в Африке: Материалы Пагуошского семинара в Кении (2006 г.)

Участники Пагуошского семинара по безопасности в Африке. Найроби, Кения, 2006 г.

CONCEPT PAPER

______________

PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

(IN PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICA PEACE FORUM)

WORKSHOP ON

 

"SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA"

 

NAIROBI, MARCH 2006

 

 

1          INTRODUCTION

The Greater Horn of Africa covers an area of approximately 5.2 million square kilometers with an estimated population of 187,504,745.[1]  It it is comprised of seven countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which together constitute membership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Apart from Kenya, the region has been characterized by violent and persistent inter-state as well as intrastate conflicts in the past 50 years, beginning in 1955 with the military uprising in Southern Sudan one year before its independence.[2] The result has been prolonged and extraordinary human suffering and destruction.  Because of the depth to which the culture of war has ingrained itself in societal norms, the region has become an unstable and unpredictable environment.  Most conflicts in this region are a result of political instability within specific countries, which spark internal strife and escalate to a full-fledged war.  They have led to the disintegration of societies and institutional structures that govern the state, hindering socio-economic development and hence resulting in underdevelopment.  Such was the example in the “failed State” of Somalia in 1991 which led to the ousting of Siad Barre, and Djibouti, which experienced a civil war from 1991 to 1994.  Other conflicts in the sub region include the inter-state wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the recently ended or on-going civil wars in the Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia.

 

Although the Greater Horn of Africa countries vary in terms of strengths, capabilities and size, the pattern of conflicts and problems affecting them are similar.  They range from internal insurgency to conflict between incumbent regimes and opponents operating from neighboring countries.  It has been observed that conflicts in the region revolve largely around issues of poor governance, lack of accountability, extreme poverty, control of natural resources, politics of exclusion and ethnicity which, among other things, compel ethnic factions within states to resort to armed violence to effect desired change.  Hence in order to comprehend the complexity of the situation in the Greater Horn of Africa, it is important to interlace the issues among countries so as to identify the common structural and proximate factors of conflicts in the region.  One cannot look at these countries in isolation because conflicts in this region form what Makumi would call a ‘conflict system’, whereby there is an interconnection in conflicts between or among states.  It is a fact that conflicts within a state do not solely impact that particular state, but have a rippling effect, which transcends territorial boundaries, causing instability and insecurity among neighboring states.

 

Some scholars have traced contributing causes of the conflicts to colonization and the cold war.  Others have attributed these conflicts largely to the inability of regional and sub-regional organizations to collectively intervene and address the wide-ranging causes.  This is perhaps a result of an apparent reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states - the norm of non-intervention.  According to Clark this arose out of practical political considerations – realpolitik, as it was recognized by regional leaders that intervention in neighboring states might evoke counter-intervention in their own states.  Consequently, the ostensible adherence to mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity reflected not only the devotion to an ideal, but was also the best insurance of regime security.[3]  To this, Ofuho adds that “Superpower interests in the region fueled the emergence of military juntas and regimes to take over power through unconstitutional means.”  This, he continues, “…plunged countries in the region into an unending state of civil wars.”[4]  The net result from this wave of armed violence was a massive infusion of small arms and light weapons into the sub-region, which has in turn complicated the security situation in the Horn of Africa.

 

As mentioned earlier, conflicts in this region go beyond individual states, whereby conflicts in one country adversely affect its neighbors.  The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea affected Djibouti and the war in Somalia had ramifications in Kenya.  It is during such conflicts that refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries are used as a conduit for small arms and light weapons transfers, as well as drug channels.  Small arms and light weapons have been a major cause of insecurity and instability in the region.  Besides the politically instigated conflicts, these countries are universally affected by other issues such as drought, which has been a source of conflict in the pastoral communities, particularly the Karamoja cluster.  The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), formerly known as Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), decided in 1996 to revitalize its “…mandate that would inter alia allow it to address more directly the conflicts in the region which were affecting negatively the implementation of development programs.”[5]  This is seen in part in its concerted effort in the CEWARN program to try to mitigate conflicts and reduce violence among the pastoralist communities in the Karamoja and Somali clusters.  Because of this interconnectedness, a regional (rather than a national) approach is recommended to address common issues.

 

The continuing state conflicts and insecurity in the region have given rise to a series of human rights problems: the Horn of Africa is a top refugee generating region, hosting close to 6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, with Sudan topping the list with about four million IDPs[6].  It has also been the source of many deaths, mostly from lack of food and water. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has also contributed to the escalation of crime within the region. Children’s rights have been flagrantly abused as they are recruited into protracted rebel wars and engulfed in the only lifestyle they have known since birth. Women are constantly looking over their shoulders for fear of being the next rape victims, as rape is used as a weapon of war in the region. Consequently countries are underdeveloped as resources allocated to socio-economic development are diverted to war. This has led to state collapse due to the lack of infrastructure and institutions to govern state resources.

 

There have been efforts by organizations involved in conflict resolution and management within the region, but the complexity of the underlying causes has stunted these efforts while their capacities fall short of making positive change for peace.  The OAU has tried, but its management and general response to conflicts have been largely inadequate.  Efforts by the CSSDCA (Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa) to provide all that is included in its acronym, are yet to be seen.  The UN has also been party to the efforts towards creating stability in the horn, but their participation has been mainly humanitarian, whether in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia or Eritrea.  IGAD, which has been a major player in ending the longest war in Africa, has been hailed for the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by Sudan and the installation of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.

 

While the above efforts have contributed to the current status of events in the Greater Horn of Africa, as regards to ‘peace and security’, there is a need to re-evaluate the approach with which it was attained.  Now more then ever, there is a call on the IGAD member countries to work towards a regional security architecture.  This is because, as Markakis explains, the conflict situation in the Greater Horn of Africa has been exacerbated not only by its geographic location but also the continuous struggle for hegemony among its constituent states.[7]  Violence continues in the Darfur region of Sudan, despite the signing of the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); apprehension still lingers over Somalia's future after protracted negotiations resulted in another peace agreement signed in Nairobi in November 2004; and the senseless civil war in Uganda unleashed on the local population by the mysterious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) shows little sign of coming to a resolution.

 

 

2.         OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN THE REGION

Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda have been affected the most by civil wars and internal conflicts, including violent overthrow of governments.  In Uganda, a rebellion by a religious cult, the LRA, is in its 19th year and shows no signs of abating. Pockets of tension still exist in the sub-region at both intra-state and inter-state levels: the problem in Darfur; the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia over unmarked and unresolved borders; tension on the Kenya/Ethiopia border regarding the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); livestock rustling between pastoralist communities on the common Kenya/Uganda, Kenya/Ethiopia, Kenya/ Sudan, and Kenya/Somali borders, and the frequent massacres of innocent civilians by bandits from across the common borders.

 

Following is an overview of four countries in the sub-region with a history of violent conflicts.

3.1       Ethiopia: One of the oldest states in Africa, its modern and turbulent history begins around 1889 when Emperor Menelik II ascended to the throne.  In 1930 Ras Tafari became Emperor Haile Selassie I, marking the beginning of one of the longest reigns in Africa.  It ended in 1974, when the pro-USA Emperor was overthrown and replaced by a 120-man military committee, known as the Dergue.  

 

Power struggles within the Dergue saw the rise of a pro-Soviet leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, in February 1977, and a rule of bloody terror that ended 14 years later.  During his rule, Mengistu purged the Dergue, ordered the execution of prominent members of the former regime (as well as relatives of the deposed Emperor), expelled US officials from Ethiopia, closed down US aid agencies, shut down the radio station, and turned to the USSR for military assistance.  A full-scale war with Somalia ensued, when the latter took advantage of weaknesses in the Dergue and invaded the Ogaden region in June 1977.  Mengistu sought USSR military assistance and brought in Cuban troops.

 

The Somali occupation of the Ogaden ended in May 1978 after which Mengistu signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship with the USSR. Somalia, which hitherto depended on Soviet military assistance, reacted by severing diplomatic relations with the USSR and turned to the USA.  Internal rebellion against Mengistu intensified and was exacerbated by wide-spread hunger.  This led to his ouster and exile to Zimbabwe at the end of 1991 by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by Meles Zenawi.  Zenawi had worked together with the Eritrean leader, Isaias Afewwerki, to defeat the army of the Mengistu regime, which at that time was one of the largest and best equipped armies in Africa.  They also went on to work together to bring about Eritrea’s separation from the rest of Ethiopia[8].

 

Since coming to power in 1991, the EPRDF (a fairly broad-based coalition of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front and other insurgent groups that helped overthrow Mengistu) tried to resolve internal conflicts of interests within Ethiopia through peaceful means. Similarly, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) tried to draw the opposition groups within and outside Eritrea into a loose coalition. However, relations between the two nations deteriorated as a result of tensions and disputes over the Ethiopia/Eritrea border, Ethiopia’s access to the sea, and ethnic politics.  These issues resulted in the eruption of war in 1998 [9].  

 

3.2       Somalia - An equally ancient country in Africa, Somali clans have occupied the Horn of Africa area for more than 2,000 years.  A British protectorate was proclaimed over the clans in the north in 1884, and an Italian protectorate in the south in 1886.  In 1960 British and Italian Somaliland joined to form an independent Republic of Somalia, with "Greater Somalia" as its leading foreign policy thrust.  Somalia's claims over the Ogaden in Ethiopia and the then Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya and Djibouti, brought Somalia into a collision course, not only with its neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia, but also with France, the colonial power ruling the so-called French Territories of the Afars and Issas, Djibouti.

 

Political instability in Somalia originated in the 1969 coup by Maj-Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre against the democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmake.  The new military dictator swiftly moved to the Soviet block while showing open hostility towards the USA, which was friendly with Emperor Haile Selassie.  Maj-Gen. Siad Barre nationalised foreign assets and visited Moscow where he signed a Treaty of Friendship in exchange for military hardware and training.  The government of the USA reported in 1975 that the USSR had installed atomic guided missile facilities in Somalia, and cited this as the major reason for the construction of the US naval base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.

 

Following Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia and occupation of the Ogaden region in June 1977, as well as its loss of Soviet and Cuban support, Siad Barre severed relations with Cuba and cancelled the Treaty of Friendship with the USSR.  In 1980, the USA and Somalia signed an agreement allowing the USA to use a military base in Somalia, in return for economic and military assistance.  Siad Barre was overthrown by a combination of rebel forces at the end of 1990 and fled into exile where he died a few years later.

 

The rebel forces were made up of two major groups – the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the United Somali Congress Party (USC). The SNM controlled almost the whole of the north of the country which eventually became Somaliland, while the USC dominated the southern part. The factions within the USC, having deposed their common enemy, fragmented into clan-based groups and a devastating civil war broke out afresh. The violence that ensued caused massive destruction of property and internal and external displacement of Somalis. For the whole of the civil war, the contentions of the warring parties remained at the level of individual and clan-based interests on economics, property rights and political space; tied to these is a complex web of regional interests involving all of Somalia’s neighbours.[10] It is hoped that a more stable balance of clan interests has been reached by virtue of the elections held in Nairobi in 2005, during which a new president was elected.

 

The net result of the civil war and numerous changes of alliances was the massive introduction of small arms and light weapons into both Ethiopia and Somalia, which eventually found their way into neighbouring countries, including Kenya.

 

3.3       Sudan - The largest country in Africa and one of the richest has also been one of the most politically unstable, experiencing no less than four military coups since its independence in January 1956.  An Anglo-Egyptian condominium ruled the Sudan as two separate entities: the closed territory in the South where some amount of Christianity was introduced among the local communities, and the North where Islam was practiced.  The rationale used by the British was that they needed to seal off the South from the North in order to “protect” the South from Islamic influence and oppression[11]. Some Northern Sudanese historians have argued that it is this separation that facilitated the tensions between the North and the South.  However, it has also been conceded that tensions between North and South predated British rule[12].  Discrimination by Northerners against Southerners in most aspects of life fueled a military uprising in the South in 1955 (the Anyanya I uprising), shortly before independence.    

 

Popular revolution brought back civilian rule in 1964, but it was overthrown five years later by Col. Gafar el-Nimeiry, who successfully negotiated the 1974 Addis Ababa Agreement with the rebellious Anyanya leaders.  Col. Nimeiry expelled Soviet military advisors in 1977, replacing them with American advisors.  It was Col. Numeiry who issued the presidential order that shari’a “be the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan”.[13]  The authoritarian rule, forced Islamization, and exclusion of non-Muslims by Col. Nimeiry made the South resume its military uprising (the Anyanya II uprising), which weakened Col. Numeiry’s administration and led to his final overthrow  in August 1985.  The American Chevron Oil Company, which made the first major oil discovery in Southern Sudan in 1979, was forced to suspend drilling as a result of the uprising.

 

After several changes in military leadership, Sudan held democratic elections resulting in the short-lived government of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a veteran politician and leader of the Umma Party.  Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown by an Islamist, Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Omar El-Bashir in 1989, who entrenched some of Nimeiry's fundamentalist Islamic ideologies, further dividing the Sudan along racial and religious lines - Christian South and Muslim North.

 

In 1983, an American trained Agricultural Economist, Col. John Garang de Mabior, launched the third phase of rebellion, meant to entrench the rights of Southerners and introduce a democratic, secular government in the Sudan. The rebellion, coming after Anyanya I and Anyanya II, ended in January 2005 with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement - CPA, signed in Nairobi between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - SPLM/A. Unfortunately, Col. Garang died in a helicopter accident in Southern Sudan at the end July 2005, before full implementation of the CPA.  To continue the entrenchment of peace in Sudan after Garang, his deputy in the SPLM/A, Salva Kirr was chosen to replace him and to sustain the confidence level of the Southerners in the new Sudanese government. 

 

3.4       Uganda - A former British Protectorate, it became independent in October 1962 under a complicated constitutional dispensation that juxtaposed two opposing political leaders- the Kabaka (King) of Buganda as the titular President of Uganda, and the left-leaning politician, Milton Apollo Obote, as his Prime Minister.  The political co-habitation did not last long.  Prime Minister Obote used the newly promoted and semi-literate Second World War veteran, Col. Idi Amin Dada, to mount an assault on Kabaka's Palace.  Kabaka escaped to Britain where he lived and died in poverty.  Obote became President, promoting Idi Amin to the post of the Chief of the General Staff.

 

Idi Amin, full of political ambition, overthrew his own ally, Obote, in January 1971, starting an eight-year rule of terror in Uganda, which ended when the combined Tanzania People's Defence Force and the rag-tag anti-Amin dissident militia (the Ugandan guerrilla forces) overthrew Amin in April 1979.  A series of incompetent, largely corrupt rulers emerged in the wake of the overthrow.  Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, a young ideologue who became a guerrilla leader, successfully led a rebellion that overthrew the military rule of Maj.-Gen. Tito Okello in 1985 and has held the office of President ever since.  Following the recent death in Zambia of former President Milton Obote, Uganda now has the dubious distinction of being the only country in the Horn of Africa, if not entire continent, where four of its former Heads of State have died in exile.

 

The end of the cold war, apart from considerably reducing tension in the sub-region (particularly between Ethiopia and Somalia, and Somalia and Kenya), has generated greater inclination on the part of IGAD member states to resolve the previous and recent intra-state/inter-state tensions through mediation, using the IGAD good offices.  The successful negotiations of the Sudan and Somali conflicts by Kenya, and the cooperation and support from the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) and other multilateral agencies, has ushered in a new dawn of hope for peace in the Horn of Africa.

 

From the above summaries, it’s clear that the Greater Horn of Africa has gone through decades of insecurity, resulting in widespread destruction of property and human suffering.  The traditional view, in which issues regarding state security were purely the concern of individual states, has changed drastically.  This can be seen in any discourse on security issues, which now must include the dimension of human security, and in the emergence and evolution of sub-regional bodies addressing security concerns as fundamental elements in any analysis of state insecurity[14].  This widening of space has resulted in security being seen within larger regional contexts and has necessitated the realization that security concerns are largely the business of sub-regional security arrangements.  Hence the Pugwash Workshop on "Regional Security Architecture in the Greater Horn of Africa" comes at an opportune moment, after the successful negotiations to end the conflict in Sudan and Somalia, giving this international peace lobby body a unique opportunity to make a contribution towards peace and security in the war-torn Horn of Africa.

 

 

3.         Workshop Rationale

Given the continued violence and poor developmental initiatives in the Horn of Africa, a lot of effort in the past has been exerted by both governmental and non-governmental organizations to try to develop the most effective conflict management mechanisms to be applied to the conflicts in this region.  Conflict management in its comprehensive form should be seen and appreciated as a system that at any given time and at every stage involves not only many actors reacting to one another, but also a range of activities in the areas of peace-making, peace-building and peace-keeping[15].  Although at its inception in 1963 the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was given the task of managing conflicts and the overall general response to them, it has remained largely ineffective.

 

The OAU was severely restricted in its ability to address conflicts arising in Member States due to the emphasis placed on the principle of uti possidetis and sovereignty as stated in the provisions of Article III of the OAU Charter - “…non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for the [national sovereignty] of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence….”[16]  Thus the OAU suffered many failures, ranging from a restricted ability to manage conflict and violence, to an initial tendency to keep silent over serious violations of human rights[17].  Growing concern over this restricted ability to address conflicts in the region prompted the OAU to establish its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993, which elevated the organization’s profile in conflict management.  This was perhaps because the superpowers were reluctant to intervene in conflicts where they had no strategic interest, as was the case in Liberia and Somalia.  This resulted in the organization taking on more latitude in the internal matters of Member States.  However the increased visibility of OAU actions and initiatives did little to abate the spread of conflicts in the region[18].  It was hoped that the evolution of the OAU into the African Union would also improve the conflict management capabilities of the organization and allow for the renewed adoption of the Pan-Africanist ideal of African solutions to African problems.

 

The call for African solutions to African problems prompted the AU to develop the Peace and Security Council (PSC),[19] a mechanism that will take charge in addressing Africa’s domestic problems.  The new emphasis reflects the idea of common security based upon a community of citizens, bound together by multiple ties of common interest and commitment to basic values[20].  The PSC, however, puts more emphasis on conflict prevention than conflict resolution, of which the Horn is in dire need.  The AU has yet to mature in the areas of peace keeping, conflict resolution, and post conflict reconstruction. Since it lacks the necessary peace building expertise and strength, it is imperative for sub-regional structures, be they governmental or non-governmental, to seek alternative conflict de-escalation and resolution mechanisms.  The Pugwash Conference could provide many such solutions, as it is expected to develop formidable strategies that will inform policy on security and stability in the sub-region.

 

While the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) seeks to fulfill all that is stated in its name, security and stability still remain unanswered questions in the Horn of Africa.  NEPAD`s idea of establishing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) with the mission of monitoring a country’s commitment to its principles was a noble idea, but one that seems to be a losing battle.  This is because, as Mwanasali puts it, “… the APRM has been reduced to a nearly toothless instrument to take inventory of only what members states voluntarily accept to disclose.”[21]  It has therefore become imperative to seek new ways of working out security review mechanisms for building security programs for Africa, and for the Horn of Africa in particular. This is what the Pugwash Conference intends to achieve.

 

So far, civil society has been concerned and active in tackling security concerns in the Horn, as well as working in conjunction with governments and community-based organizations.  However, according to Mwagiru, “…the NGO world has been criticized for failing to provide meaningful solutions to the problem of insecurity since they only meet in conference rooms where they exchange notes and hefty allowances.”[22]  Whatever the case, the need for a new approach to security architecture cannot be overstated.  A lot of ideas and resources are still being used to try to bring order to the horn, yet it appears the task has only begun.  Mwanasali[23] says “…the ideas are good; we fail in the implementation stage.”  The complex nature of the Horn’s conflicts calls for a unified effort at the local, national, regional, and international levels if the dream of having a conflict-free Horn of Africa is ever to be realized.  Much as it is a call on the governments to put in place security structures and institutions in the region, the role of non-state actors, and in this case civil society, cannot be ignored.  Thus the Pugwash Conference would go a long way in making a judicious contribution to the building of security architecture in the Horn of Africa.

 

4.         WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

The principal objective of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in convening this Workshop is to bring together key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, comprising officials of governmental and inter-governmental organizations, military and security personnel, academics, and the broad civil society, to discuss security architecture in the sub-region, focusing mainly on conflict and security.

 

This workshop aims, among other things, to examine the future of the sub-region with the purpose of formulating suggestions for a viable regional security architecture, which will be shared with stakeholders of both state and non-state actors.

 

The Workshop more specifically proposes to:

·                    Identify the domestic and regional sources of conflicts and their interlinkages

·                    Examine the role of existing sub-regional security structure in its responses to conflict

·                    Identify strengths and challenges of regional security mechanisms

·                    Discuss the impact of conflicts in the sub region and the challenges facing post-conflict states, particularly Somalia and Sudan.

·                    Make suggestions for viable regional security architecture

 

5.         METHODOLOGY

The conference will be based on interactive discussions among participants, some of whom have had involvement with the peace processes in the sub-region, notably, Sudan and Somalia. Commissioned papers will form the basis for dialogue/discussion among participants for the creation of new ideas on security in the region. About 25 – 30 participants, to be selected from among governments, inter-governmental organizations, academia, and security personnel within the sub-region, have been invited to the two-day workshop.

 

A comprehensive workshop report, including emerging recommendations, will be prepared and shared with all conference participants, key policy makers, and other stakeholders in the security sector in the region.



[1] The World Fact book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook

[2] Goldsmith P. et al., Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of African Conflict; in Centre for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies, P191.

 

[3] Clark, John F, “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, in Dunn, Kevin & Shaw, Timothy (Eds), Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p. 97.

[4] Ofuho C. H., “Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa”, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisatio, Makumi Mwagiru: (ed), 2004, p. 11.

[5] Mwagiru M.,Towards Security Architecture in the IGAD Region” in African Regional Security in  the Age of Globalisation, Makumi Mwagiru: (ed),. Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, p.141

[6] Odera J. & Hiteng C., “Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa”, Volume1, Issue 1, p. 14.

[7] Markakis J., Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation; Makumi Mwagiru: (ed). Heinrich Boll Foundation. 2004  p.7

[8] Lata, Leenco, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War and the Role of the UN and the OAUin Boulden, Jane (Ed)  'Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The UN and Regional Organizations'  Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

[9] Yoh, John G. Nyuot, ‘Peace Processe and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa’ in Africa Security Review, Volume 12 Number 3, Institute for Security Studies, 2003

[10] Ochieng Kamudhayi, “The Somali Peace Process”, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization, p. 122, Makumi Mwagiru (ed.), Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004.

[11] Ann Mosley Lesch, The Sudan – Contested National Identities, pg 31, Indiana University Press, 1998.

[12] Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “Discovering The South”, in African Affairs, 89:356, July 1990.

[13] Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan, p. 280, London: Frank Cass, 1987.

[14] Makumi Mwagiru, African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization, Introduction, Makumi Mwagiru (ed.), Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004.

Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998, P. 246.

[16] The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963 at www.oau-oau.org

[17] Lata, Leenco, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War and the Role of the UN and the OAU”, in Boulden, Jane (ed), Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The UN and Regional Organizations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

[18] International Peace Academy Report, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, see the IPA website http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriAssessPrint.htm

[19]  AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, Durban, 9 July 2002.

[20] Background Paper for African Development Forum, Peace and Security Dimensions of the African Union, InterAfrica Group / Justice Africa at http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/docs/p&sbackground.PDF

[21] Mwanasali M., Emerging Security Architecture in Africa, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, Vol. 17, no. 4, p. 126.

[22]  Mwagiru M.,Towards Security Architecture in the IGAD Region”, in African Regional Security in  the Age of Globalisation; Makumi Mwagiru: (ed). Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, p.16.

[23]  Mwanasali M., Emerging Security Architecture in Africa, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, Vol 1,  no. 4, p. 128.

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